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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 15919

CHARLES STEVEN ARCHULETTA,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by information with one
count of rape and one count of forcible sodomy in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 and 403, respectively.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In a trial before a jury presided over by the
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., conducted on June 1 and
2, 1978, in the Third Judicial District, appellant was found
guilty of forcible sodomy.

Appellant was accordingly

sentenced to a term of 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent urges this Court to sustain the
conviction and sentence of appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the evening of September 27, 1977, Michelle

s.

Christiansen and several of her girlfriends were returning
home from a picnic when they noticed appellant driving a
pick-up truck on a parallel course (T. at 15, 137, and 147).
A conversation started and appellant invited Ms. Christiansen
and her friends to a party (T. at 16).

The women followed

appellant to the site of the party where he left his truck
and rode with them as they drove home to change clothes
(T. at 17).

One of the women, Diane Visick, decided not to

return to the party, but allowed Michelle and her friend
Lisa Don Thornwall to return with appellant in her (Ms.
Visick's) car (T. at 17,18).

The three purchased some

beer and then went to the party for a short while (T. at 18
and 154).

Although marijuana was being used at the party

(T. at 18 and 155), Ms. Christiansen denies having smoked
any (T. at 37).

None of the other witnesses could say

whether she had had any or not (T. at 125 and 155).
Appellant, Michelle S. Christiansen, and Lisa
Don Thornwall, then left the party and drove to an area
in the vicinity of the State Capitol Building where they
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continued to drink beer (T. at 19).
appellant (T. at 20 and 157).

Both girls were kissing

Mi'chell e Ch ris
· t'iansen testified:

. And then Charley (Appellant) asked
us if we had ever taken vitamin pills
to coat your stomach so that you don't
get drunk, you don't get sick from
drinking. And I said, "yeah". And he
said, "Do you want to take some?" And
I said, "no. "
And then he took some.
And so I thought, well, that's probably
what they are, so Lisa Don and I took
a pill from him.
(T. at 19).

She noted that the pill was football-shaped and
green, of a jelly compound.

Appellant also gave the

victim another capsule, claiming it too was a vitamin pill
(T. at 19 and 20).

Lisa Don Thornwall confirmed Ms.

Christiansen's account with respect to the party and then
the pills (T. at 155 and 160).

Unlike Ms. Christiansen,

however, Ms. Thornwall noted that she was home in bed
within two hours of taking the pills (T. at 160).
The three left the capitol area and drove to
appellant's mother's house (T. at 21).

Lisa Don Thornwall

took the car and returned home, leaving appellant with Ms.
Christiansen (T. at 21).
a car from his sister.

Appellant said that he would get
Ms. Christiansen indicated that she

wanted to use a restroom and appellant responded that his
mother was asleep.

He led the victim around the corner to

an apartment he described as that of his good friend and his
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"home away from home."

(T. at 22).

a window and opened the door.

Appellant went in

throu~

Ms. Christiansen noted that

at that point she was feeling tired and very dizzy.

After

using the bathroom, she sat down on the couch and passed out
as appellant stated that he would check to see if his
sister had returned with the car (T. at 23).
When Ms. Christiansen came to, appellant was
standing in the doorway.

She got up, .but at his insistance,

sat down on the floor feeling all the while tired, dizzy and
weak.

Appellant pushed her over and began rubbing lotion

on her back as he removed her shirt (T. at 23 and 24).

The

victim testified:

Q. Did you want him to take the
shirt off?
A. No.
I was just laying there
on the floor,.I thought I was going
to pass out again.
I was really dizzy.
I said I didn't want him to take my
shirt off.
{T.at24).
Appellant then removed all Ms. Christiansen's clothes and
began to rub lotion all over her body (T. at 24).
victim described the succeeding events:

Q. Did you want him to take the
rest of yorir clothing off?
A.

No.

Q. Did you do anything to prevent
him from doing it?
A.

No.

Q.

Why?
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The

A.
I felt dizzy, I felt iik~ I was
going to pass out. I just felt lik~
I was asleep.

Q. Did you tell him you didn't
want him to take your clothes off?
A.
I told him I didn't want him
to take my clothes off.

Q. Did he make any response to
that statement?
A.

I don't believe so.

Q. Did he do anything in
response to that statement?
A.

He just took my clothes off.

Q.

Then what happened?

A. Then he kept rubbing my
back and putting lotion all over me,
and started putting it in my hair and
stuff. And then he laid down on top
of me, or was laying on my stomach on
the floor, and he started to have
intercourse with me.

Q. Will you describe what you
mean when you say "have intercourse"?·.
A.
He started--he just laid on
top of me, and started to have
intercourse with me.

Q. Describe what you mean by "have
intercourse"?
A. Have sex.
inside of my body.

His penis was entering

Q.

What part of your body?

A.

In my vagina.

Q.

And what occurred at that time?
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A. I asked him to stop. And I
tried to get up, but I just--it was
like I didn't have any control over
my muscles. Anu I just. laid there
the floor.

on

Q.

Then what happened?

A. And.then--then he, then he
rolled me over so I was on my back,
and he continued having intercourse
with me. And then he stopped, and
he said that he wanted me to have
oral sex with him. And I said no.
I said, "I want to go home." I said,
"Just let me go, I want to go home."
And so he said, "No," he said, "I
want you to do this for me." And I
said, "No, I don't want to.
I want to
go home."
And then--then he grabbed--I
tried to get up, he grabbed me and he
pushed me back down on the floor.
And
he said, you know, "Do it for me."
And I just said, "No." And I started
to cry. And he got mad at me.
Q.

At this point how did you feel?

A.
I was scared.
go home.
Q.

And I wanted to

How did you feel physically?

A.
I was sick to my stomach, I
was dizzy. I started--I could move
around, I could, you know, sit up.
Q.
Did you make any other effort
to prevent what he was doing?
A.
I 'tried to get away, and then
I couldn't get away.
Q.

Why couldn't you?

A.
He was holding me down. And
then I tried to scream. And he grabbed
my face, and he put his hand over my
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face and he said, "Don't scream" he said,
"Nobody can hear you, anyway." And he
started getting really mad at me.
And then--and then I wouldn't do
what he was asking me to do. And so
there was a Michelob bottle sitting on
the coffee table behind us.

Q.

What is a Michelob bottle?

A.

It's a beer bottle.

Q.

Then what happened?

A.
And he picked that bottle off
the table, and he started to peel the
paper off the bottle. And he was still-he was laying on my back and kind of
sitting on my feet. And I said, "What
are you going to do?" I said, "Let me
go."
I said, "I thought we were going
to go to breakfast." And he said, "No,
we are not going." And I said, "What are
you trying to go?" He said, "You know
what I am going to do." And I said, "What
are you going to do?" And he said, "I'm
going to make it easier for you to do
this."
And I said, "Let me go." And he said,
"No." He said, "I know you want ,to do
this.
You are just trying to make me
mad." And so he took the Michelob bottle,
and he tried to force it up into my vagina.
And I arabbed his arm, and I. told him to
stop, ~nd I told him I'd do what he
wanted me to do. And so--so then I tried
to do it for him, and he kept getting
mad at me and he kept telling me I wasn't
doing it right.

Q. Will you describe what it was
you tried to do for him?
A.
He had me put his penis in my
mouth and kiss it, and stuff like that.
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Q.

Did you actually do that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you want to do that?

A.

No.

Q.

Yfuy didn't you?

A. I was afraid he was going to
hurt me.
Q.

All right.

Then what happened?

A. Then I tried--thought if I just
did that for him, that maybe, you know, he'd
let me go and I could just leave. And I
kept trying, but I kept gagging and
choking. And he'd get made at me and
tell me that he knew that I knew how to
do it, and that I was getting sick on
purpose to make him mad.
And then he got mad at me, and he
grabbed me and he forced himself down
my throat. And then he laid on top of
me and said that if I didn't make him have
a climax that I was going to be sorry. And
so I tried to do what he wanted me to do.
And then he had a climax in my mouth, and
I spit it on the floor.
And he got mad at
me. And I said I wanted to go, I wanted
to go home. And he said--he grabbed me,
and he said, "Do you love me?" And I said-I looked at him and I was scared.
And
he said, "I know you love me." He says,
"You love me, don't you?" And I says,
"Yes, I do." And then-Q.

Did you love him?

A.

No.

Q.

Why did you say that?

A. Because I thought maybe that
he would let me go.
I wanted to
leave, and I would have said anything he
wanted me to say.
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Q.

And then what happened?

A.
Then I said, "I want to go.
Let's go out to breakfast or something."
I wan~ed to get out of the house. And
he said no.
He said, "Come in here."
And he grabbed me by my arm and he
pushed me into the other ro~m and
pushed me down on the bed. And he said 1
"Move up to the top of the bed." And I
said, "No, I won't." And he said
"Move up. " An d I said,
.
"No." And' then
he grabbed me, and I passed out again.
And then later, I woke up, and he was-he had his arm over the top of me, and
he was just on the bed next to me, and he
was asleep or passed out. And so I just
got off the bed, and I grabbed my clothes,
I pulled on my shirt and my pants, and
I grabbed my shoes, and I ran out of the
house down the street.
(T. at 25 to 29).
Ms. Christiansen found some people on the street and, using
a phone in a lady's house, called her parents who came and
got her and then called the police (T. at 30).

She was

asked if she made an effort to stop appellant:
A.

As much as I could.

Q.

And what do you mean by that?

A.
I wanted to leave, but I was just
really tired.
I felt like I couldn't
get up.
I tried to get up; I couldn't
move.
When it got later and I started
to be able to move around more and
tried to get away, the more violent
he got, and I didn't want him to hurt
me.
Like when I'd push myself up, I'd
try to get up, he knocked me ~ack
down on the floor.
When I tried to
scream, he grabbed my face and stop~ed
me from screaming.
He pulled my hair.
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Every time I tried to move away from
him he just grabbed me and pulled me
back down~
{T. at JO and 31).
She testified that she had been instructed in a high school
class to not resist a rapist if she felt she was physically
unable to make the rapist incapable of hurting her and that
she had done all she felt she could (T. at 52).
Ms. Christiansen was examined by Dr. Keith Evens,
an ob3tetrics-gynecology resident at the University Hospital.
Although he noted no signs of physical or psychological
trauma,

(T. at 113 and 116), he did note that he was

unaware that she had been sedated (T. at 116), and that his
examination took place approximately 12 hours following the
incident (T. at 112).

He also stated that many of the

normal symptoms of physical abuse would not be visible so
long after the trauma (T. at 116 and 117).
During the examination, blood and urine samples
were taken from the victim and eventually transported to the
toxicology center at the University of Utah for analysis
(T. at 61, 63, 64 and 66).

Detective Pat Smith carried the

samples with her for a period of time.

(It is unclear from

the record how long a period since the incident began
on the 27th,

1

(T. at 15) the examination must have taken

place on the 28th, although it appears from Dr. Evans'
testimony to have occurred on the 27th.

The samples were
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delivered to toxicology on the 29th.

At any rate, there was

a period of one to two days when the samples were carried,
without refrigeration, in Detective Smith's purse.
lack of refrigeration

T'rli:r

made the result somewhat

)owe.~

than a

check would have revealed ~

hc:tJ

beeh "e{ 1--i~(.r-q+J (T. ct+.~q, qs).)

An associate toxicologist, Ladislav Kopjak,
testified that analysis of the samples indicated that the
victim had had chloral hydrate introduced into her body
(T. at 96 and 99).
Dr. Brian S. Finkle, director for the University of
Utah Center for Human Toxicology, testified as to the
effects of chloral hydrate.

He noted that the substance

quickly breaks down to trichloral ethanol (which was the
substance tested for an found by Mr. Kopjak).

He noted

that practically the only reason anyone would have trichloral
ethanol in their system would be because of indigestion of
chloral hydrate (T. at 103).

Dr. Finkle noted:

. . . the drug chloral hydrate and
trichloral ethanol which I have explained
is the active product, is a sedative.
It is designed deliberately to induce .
sleep sedation in incividuals, depending
upon the dose.
It is commonly used in
its sedative dosages to induce or to
allay anxiety, to relax people, and to
make them generally sedated--not
necessarily to go to sleep or to feel
sleepy, but certainly t~ b~ relaxed.
In
doses higher than that it is often
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employed medically to assist people who
have insomnia, who can't go to sleep at
night, and they might take a dose of
this drug such that it would induce
sleep at about half an hour or an hour
after they took the drug.
(T. at 105).

Dr. Finkle further indicated that "many, many, many manufacturers
make

this drug in many forms--but the usual form is a

capsule, a soft gelatin capsule, a soft gelatin capsule,
and it genera1ly comes in two different sizes, and a dose
could be one capsule of either size."

The doses are 500

milligrams and 1,000 milligrams (T. at 106).
In consideration of a hypothetical question
containing the reported concentration of trichloral ethanol
and the other facts of this case, Dr. Finkle stated:
The concentration that I was given,
albeit, again ,twelve hours after the
dosage, would in and of itself, in
my opinion, have at least induced sedation,
and could in some subjects have induced
sleep. Therefore, obviously, as I said
earlier, the blood concentration, at
some point, be it prior to the blood
sample that was taken, was much higher
than six. I would say that the individual who had ingested that drug in
all probability ingested a dose greater
than that which would have been given
by a physician for medical purpose, and
subsequent blood concentration would
have been such, certainly, as to have
made them drowsy and possibly would
have put them to sleep.
(T. 105).

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Preston J. Truman, the host of the party attended
by the victim, appellant, and Lisa Don Thornwall, testified
that he was under the care of a physician and had been
prescribed chloral hydrate as a sedative.

He noted that

the chloral hydrate was in the form of a gelatin footballshaped green capsule.
in his bathroom.

His pills were kept in plain sight

The inventory after the incident revealed

that he was short by about seven capsules the quantity he
should have had if he had been taking them at the prescribed
level

(T. at 122 to 124).
After consideration of the evidence, the jury

returned a verdict of not guilty of rape, but guilty of
forcible sodomy (T. at 182).

-13-
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POINT I
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE JURY FINDING OF GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.
The crime of forcible sodomy is set forth in
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 (1953), as amended:
(1) A person commits sodomy when he
engages in any sexual act involving the
genitals of one person and the mouth or
anus of another person, regardless of the
sex of either participant.
(2) A person commits forcible sodomy
when he commits sodomy upon another without
the other's consent. (Emphasis added.)
Lack of consent is explained in Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-406

(1953), as amended:
An act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, or
sexual abuse is without consent of the victim
under any of the following circumstances:
(1) When the actor compels the victim to
submit or participate by force that overcomes
such earnest resistance as might reasonably
be expected under the circumstances; or
(2)
The actor compels the victim to submit
or participate by any threat that would prevent
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution;
or
(3) The victim has not consented and the
actor knows the victim is unconscious, unaware
that the act is occurring, or physically
unable to resist; or
(4) The actor knows that as a result of
mental disease or defect, the victim is at the
time of the act incapable either of
appraising the nature of the act or of
resisting it; or
(5)
The actor knows that the victim submits
or participates because the victim erroneously
believes that the actor is the victim's spouse;
or
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(6)
The actor_in~entionally impaired
the power of the victim to appraise or
control his or her conduct by administering
any substance without his or her knowledge;
or
(7)
The victim is under fourteen years
of age.
(Emphasis added.)
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence it
is well settled that:
It is the prerogative of the jury to
judge the weight of the evidence, the
credibility of the witnesses, and the facts
to be found therefrom. For a defendant to
prevail upon a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain his conviction, it
must appear that viewing the evidence and
all inferences that may reasonably be drawn
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the
verdict of the jury, reasonable minds could
not believe him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
To set aside a verdict it must appear
that the evidence was so inconclusive or
unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting
fairly must have entertained reasonable doubt
that defendant committed the crime. Unless
the evidence compels such conclusion as a
matter of law, the verdict must be sustained.
State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975)

(emphasis added).

See also State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908, 909 (Utah 1978);
State v. Reddish, 550 P.2d 728 (Utah 1976); State v. Harless,
23 Utah 2d 128, 459 P.2d 210, 211 (1969); and State v.
Sims, 30 Utah 2d 357, 517 P.2d 1315, 1317 (1974).
Moreover, this Court has maintained that in a sex
offense case, a conviction may be based upon the testimony
of the prosecutrix alone:
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In regard to the general charge that
the evidence does not support the verdict:
the defendant argues that the conviction
should be scrutinized with great care
because it is a charge easy to make and
hard to defend against; particularly so
here because important parts of the state's
case rest entirely upon the testimony of
the prosecutrix. With that general proposition we are in accord. But it also should
be kept in mind that this offense is rarely
committed in the presence of witnesses and
often the conviction of the guilty could only
be had upon the victim's testimony.
It has often
been held that if there is nothing inherently
contradictory or incredible in her story a
conviction may rest upon the victim's
testimony alone.
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 865, 868 (1959).
See also State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700, 701-702 (Utah 1977).
There is nothing inherently contradictory in Ms.
Christiansen's story and there is more than sufficient
evidence to support a reasonable belief that no reasonable
doubt existed as to appellant's guilt.

Although, as

appellant notes in his brief on page 10, there is no
physical evidence to corroborate the fact of intercourse or
sodomy,

neither

is there any compelling inconsistency in

the jury's belief that one or both of the acts took place.
Evaluation of all the evidence, including the credibility
of Ms. Christiansen's

testimon~

is the sole prerogative of

the jury and their verdict should not be upset unless such
a result is compelled by inherent inconsistency.
Ward, supra.
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State v.

Ms. Christiansen's description of the events
leading up to the time when she and appellant were left
alone was corroborated in virtually every detail by
all witnesses.

Her account of her weakened physical

state exactly accords with Dr. Finkle's description of
the effect of chloral hydrate (T. at 25-29 and 105).
Cloral hydrate was found to have been present in her
system (T. at 96 and 99) and an obvious source for
the drug was identified (T. at 122-124).
It is not inconsistent for Ms. Christiansen to
have felt weak and dizzy and out of control and yet still
have some ability to talk and move about.
resist was reduced by the drug.

Her capacity to

As Dr. Finkle noted, the

drug:
is commonly used in its sedative
dosage to incude or to allay anxiety, to
relax people, and to make them generally
sedated • • • not necessarily to go to sleep
or feel sleepy, but certainly to be relaxed.

(T. at 105.)
Although the examining physician found no bruises
or evidence of physical trauma, he noted that such evidence
might not be apparent after so long a time and that he was
not aware at the time of examination of the possibility
that Ms. Christainsen had been sedated.

-17-

(T. at 112-117).
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As to appelldnt's character, he states in his
brief on page 10 that Ms. Christiansen testified that he
was concerned about her well-being and refers the reader
to page 23 of the transcript.

Although she said, at that

point, that he asked, "don't you feel good?", he also asked,
"are you high?" and then proceeded to get her to sit down on
the floor and began rubbing lotion on her.

Concern for

her well-being might be one characterization, but a
more rational

one would be concern over whether the

drug had taken effect.

The prosecutrix's testimony as

to appellant being "nice" was in response to the question
concerning how she felt about him at the party before
the incident (T. at 39).

Detective Smith did say in

direct examination for the defense that appellant was
cooperative, but that is all:

Q. Okay. Now, you talked to Charley
about this occurrence, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. And he was cooperative at all times?
A. Yes.
(T. at 130.)

Ms. Visick stated that appellant was concerned and
helped search for Ms. Christiansen (T. at 143) but such
action could easily be explained as an attempt to cover up
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or avoid prosecution for what he had just done.
does not follow,

rt simply

from what the various witnesses said about

appellant's disposition, that a reasonable person must
entertain a reasonable doubt that he would have committed
the crime.
Ms. Christiansen's lack of consent was established
under any of several subsections of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-406, supra.
II

Subsection (1) requires that the actor:

• compel the victim to submit or participate by force

that overcomes such earnest resistance as might reasonably
be expected under the circumstances.u
and dizzy (T. at 25).

The victim was weak

She had been instructed in school

to not resist when resistance appeared hopeless (T. at 52).
Given that she was substantially incapacitated, she gave as
much resistance as could be expected under the circumstances.
Subsection (2) requires that the actor " • • • compel
the victim to submit or participate by any threat that would
prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution."
Here again, the evidence indicates that appellant threatened
Ms. Christiansen with the beer bottle and physical violence
(T. at 27).
force.

She was in no way capable of resisting such

The jury was justified in believing that a person of

ordinary resolution might submit in the face of such threats
under those conditions.
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Appellant was shown, finally, to have giv2n two
capsules to both Ms. Christiansen and Ms. Thornwall,
representing them to be vitamins when they were, in all
probability, chloral hydrate (T. at 19, 20, 155 and 160).
Subsection (6) of Section 76-5-406 requires that the actor
intentionally impair "the power of the victim to appraise
or control his or her conduct by administering any
substance without his or her knowledge."
Proof of lack of consent requires that the state
establish only one of the subsections of Section
In this case, the facts satisfy three.

76~5-406.

Clearly, there

was more than sufficient evidence to establish the victim's
lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 364 P.2d 109
(1961), may be distinguished and is not determinative in
the instant case.

In that case the victim, a 21 year old

woman supposedly struggled and fought with the defendant
for over three hours and yet her son sleeping in the next
room was not disturbed.

There was no evidence of marks

or bruises, and the complaint was not made until two and
one-half hours after the supposed rape.

There was no

indication of any use of drugs in that case.

In the instant

matter, however, it was established that the victim was

-20-
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drugged with a sedative.

As soon as she recovered from

the effects of the drug she grabbed her clothes and ran
to a phone (T. at 29).

Although, as in Horne, there was

no physical evidence of a struggle nor of a vigorous
attempt to seek help and there was some time delay in
making the complaint.

The absence of such evidence and

the delay can easily be explained by the effect of the
sedative.

Unlike the account of the prosecutrix in Horne,

Ms. Christiansen's story is neither improbable nor
inherently contradictory.
CONCLUSION
In reviewing a case where the appellant claims
insufficient evidence the conviction should only be set
aside when a reasonable mind would be compelled to have
a reasonable doubt as to the appellant's guilt.

A convic-

tion based upon the prosecutrix's testimony alone in a sex
offense case should be upheld unless the story is inherently
contradictory or incredible.

In light of these standards,

the instant conviction must be affirmed.

The victim's

description of the appearance and effect of the drugs
was

corroborated by expert testimony.

Chloral hydrate

was shown to have been introduced into her system.

The

presence of the drug explains the victim's inability to
make strenuous efforts to resist or escape and the delay
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in reporting the crime.

The delay in reporting accounts

for the lack of soreness or bruises.

The record does

not support a conclusion that appellant's

character was

inconsistent with the commission of the crime.
victim's lack of consent was established

und~r

The
any of three

of the seven alternative subsections of Utah Code Ann.
§

76-5-406 (1953), as amended.

Clearly, in examining the

facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the
conviction and sentence must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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